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The Haitian Vacation: The Applicability of Sham
Doctrine to Year-End Divorces
By enacting the 1969 Tax Reform Act, 1 Congress created
new tax rates for single individuals to reduce the tax advantages
enjoyed by married persons. 2 Ironically, the new rates made
some married couples - those in which both spouses earn similar
incomes - pay higher taxes than identical unmarried couples.
What had been the protected class became the abused class. 3
Two examples reveal the discrepancy: a marriage where one
spouse earns $12,000 and the other earns $4,000 will pay $127
more than if the pair were single; if both spouses earn $30,000,
they will lose $3,970 more to taxes than their unmarried counterparts. 4
This "marriage penalty" is not inescapable. The Internal
Revenue Code determines marital status for tax purposes on December 31 of each year and provides that couples separated on
that date under a decree of divorce or separate maintenance shall
not be considered married. 5 Thus, a clever couple might benefit
from lower tax rates by divorcing on December 30 and celebrating
the New Year with remarriage.
Although Congress probably did not expect the 1969 Tax
Reform Act6 to be an incentive for separation, married couples
began contemplating tax avoidance by divorce soon after its passage. In 1972, testimony before the House Ways and Means Committee disclosed that "[people] are really considering getting
divorced on December 30 and remarrying on January 2. This is a
ridiculous situation, but certainly possible; tax savings perhaps
could finance a vacation to Haiti in order to get that quick di1. Act of Dec. 30, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (the relevant portions are
codified at I.R.C. § l(c)).
2. See S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 19, 260 (1969), reprinted in 1969-3
C.B. 425, 587.
3. Eighteen million married couples faced the disparate rates of the revised tax
schedule. See Tax Treatment of Single Persons and Married Persons Where Both Spouses
are Working: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 92d Cong., 2d Seas.
96 (1972) (statement of Edward I. Koch) [hereinafter cited as Hearings).
4. Id. at 80 (statement of Edwin S. Cohen). The marriage tax has withstood constitutional challenge under the due process and the equal protection clauses, Mapes v. United
States, 576 F.2d 896 (Ct. Cl. 1978); Johnson v. United States, 422 F. Supp. 958 (N.D. Ind.
1976), affd. sub nom. Barter v. United States, 550 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1012 (1978).
5. 1.R.C. §§ 143, 6013.
6. Act of Dec. 30, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487.
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vorce." 7 Tax-related divorces received even more public attention
in 1976 when the television show "60 Minutes" featured case
studies of marriages dissolved to save taxes. 8
After the "60 Minutes" program, the Internal Revenue Service discussed the problem hypothetically in Revenue Ruling
76-255: 9 If C and D secure a valid divorce on December 30 in a
foreign jurisdiction, and at that time intend to remarry and do
remarry in January, can C and D file returns as single individuals? The Commissioner held:
Neither section 143 nor section 6013 .of the Code or the applicable
regulations thereunder contemplates a "sham transaction" designed to manipulate for Federal income tax purposes an individual's marital status as of the close of a taxable year. See Gregory
v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465.
Accordingly, C and D for purposes of sections 143 and 6013 of
the Code were married individuals as of the close of the taxable
year 1975. Therefore, for 1975 they must file either a joint Federal
income tax return or separate returns . . . .10

1

The Commissioner's Ruling S\Jggests that the Internal Revenue
Service will challenge divorces obtained in foreign jurisdictions 11
whenever the couples intend to, and do immediately, remarry.
But although the Service has consistently upheld Revenue Ruling
7. Hearings, supra note 3, at 45 (statement of Florence B. Donahue).
8. CBS NEWS, 60 MINUTES, Marriage and Taxes (March 7, 1976, produced by M.
Goldin).
9. Rev. Rul. 76-255, 1976-2 C.B. 40.
10. Id. at 40-41.
11. It is doubtful that the foreign-jurisdiction language in Rev. Rul. 76-255 would be
interpreted to limit the holding to divorces in foreign countries. The Service has applied
Rev. Rul. 76-255 in two private Letter Rulings: Ltr. Rul. 7835076 (June 1, 1978) and Ltr.
Rul. 7830156 (April 29, 1978). Only one of the two Letter Rulings (Ltr. Ru!. 7835076)
involved a divorce in a foreign nation.
However, the challenge of a divorce in a foreign country as a sham may have greater
merit than an attack on a state divorce decree. Foreign divorce decrees are entitled not to
full faith and credit, but rather to comity. The relationship between the two was explained
by the Ninth Circuit in Montemurro v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv.:
The Mexican divorce decree was not entitled to recognition by virtue of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution (Art. IV, Sec. 1) but rather was governed by considerations of comity. "Thus, under comity - as contrasted with full
faith and credit - our courts have power to deny even prima facie validity to the
judgments of foreign countries for policy reasons, despite whatever allegations of
jurisdiction may appear on the face of such foreign judgments."
409 F.2d 832, 833 (9th Cir. 1969) (quoting Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 309 N.Y. 371, 375,
130 N.E.2d 902, 903 (1955)).
Therefore, a court might find that a divorce in a foreign country for tax purposes
would violate public policy while feeling bound by a similar state decree. The Service,
however, has yet to draw this distinction.
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76-255 in subsequent letter rulings 12 only recently has it challenged a year-end divorce scheme in court. 13
This Note examines the propriety of applying the sham doctrine to tax-motivated divorces. Section I outlines the evolution
of the sham doctrine from its exposition in Gregory v. Helvering 14
through its expression in two different tests for commercial transactions. Section II then studies the relationship between state
divorce law and the marital status provisions of the Internal Revenue Code 15 to demonstrate the clear congressional preference for
incorporating state law by reference rather than creating an independent federal law of marriage. It also examines the history of
the 1969 Tax Reform Act in a vain effort to discern a congressional desire to impose a marriage penalty. Finally, Section III
concludes that the IRS should not be permitted to use sham
theory to attack year-end divorces until it receives an explicit
congressional directive to that effect. 16
I.

GREGORY V. HELVERING AND THE

TAX

SHAM DOCTRINE

In 1935, the Supreme Court in Gregory v. Helvering 11 enunciated guidelines for declaring a transaction a sham. Gregory
owned United Mortgage Corporation, which held 1000 shares of
Monitor Securities Corporation stock. She created a new corporation, Averill, and transferred the Monitor shares to the new com12. Ltr. Rul. 7830156 (April 29, 1978); Ltr. Rul. 7835076 (June 1, 1978).
13. The Service finally decided to test Rev. Rul. 76-255 when it challenged the returns
of Angela and David Boyter. The Boyters have divorced and remarried around New Year's
three times since 1966, admittedly for tax purposes. New York Times, Sept. 11, 1979,
§ A, at 11, col. 1. They filed separate actions contesting the Service's challenge. David
Boyter v. Commissioner, No. 11445-77 (T.C., filed Nov. 16, 1977); Angela Boyter v. Commissioner, No. 11446-77 (T.C., filed Nov. 16, 1977).
14. 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
15. I.R.C. §§ 143, 6013.
16. This Note analyzes only the feasibility of attacking year-end divorces under the
sham doctrine. The Service might also attack a year-end divorce in a foreign jurisdiction
by alleging that it is invalid under the law of the couple's domicile. This tactic has the
advantage of maintaining the deference that the Service and the federal courts have
accorded to state determinations of marital status. See notes 39-67 infra and accompanying text. However, the Service would face two imposing obstacles should it choose such
an attack. First, it is unclear whether the Service, as a third party, would have standing
to challenge the validity of the couple's foreign divorce decree under the law of their state
of domicile. Second, even if the service had standing, the domicile state is likely to
recognize the foreign decree as long as the divorce proceeding is not ex parte. See R.
LEFLAR, AMERICAN CoNFLICI'S LAW § 224 (3d ed. 1977). And couples sufficiently sophisticated to invest the time and expense involved in a year-end divorce scheme are not likely
to sabotage that scheme with an ex parte divorce.
17. 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
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pany, personally receiving Averill's shares in return. When Averill dissolved six days later, Gregory acquired the Monitor shares
and claimed that she did not have to recognize income, since the
transfer derived from corporate reorganization.
Although the creation of Averill and the transfer of the shares
fit the statutory definition of reorganization, 18 the Gregory Court
found that Congress intended a corporate reorganization to be
motivated by a "business or corporate purpose" other than tax
reduction. 19 The Court held that since Gregory created Averill
only to convey stock, her reorganization was not within the purview of the statute. In reaching this conclusion, the Gregory Court
articulated the basic tenet of the tax sham doctrine:
The legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of what otherwise would be his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means which
the law permits cannot be doubted. . . . But the question for determination is whether what was done, apart from the tax motive,
was the thing which the statute intended. 20

Thus, if a transaction "lies outside the plain intent of the statute, " 21 then to uphold it "would be to exalt artifice above reality
and to deprive the statutory provision . . . of all serious purpose. "22 That principle gives courts a tool for voiding transactions
that fit within the letter, but not the spirit, of the tax code. 23
Courts have used two different tests to appraise transactions
under Gregory. The first -,- the "beneficial interest test" - was
inspired by Learned Hand's dissent in Gilbert v. Commissioner. 24
According to Hand,
If. . . the taxpayer enters into a transaction that does not appreciably affect his beneficial interest except to reduce his tax, the law
will disregard it. . . . When a taxpayer supposes that transaction,
in addition to its effect on his tax, will promote his beneficial
interests in the venture, he will of course secure the desired reduction. 25

Courts adopting the beneficial interest test are concerned primarily with whether "there was any significance to what the parties
18. Revenue Act of 1928, Pub. L. No. 70-562, ch. 582, § 112(g), 45 Stat. 791, 818.
19. 293 U.S. at 469.
20. 293 U.S. at 469.
21. 293 U.S. at 470.
22. 293 U.S. at 470.
23. See Estate of Parshelsky, 303 F.2d 14, 17 (2d Cir. 1962), where the court declared
that a transaction must be within the "spirit of the [relevant tax code] section."
24. 248 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1957).
25. 248 F.2d at 411.
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did," 26 and they usually infer "significance" from the commercial
risks in the transaction. Significantly, under the beneficial interest test a tax-reduction motive is not fatal if the transaction exposes the taxpayer to a genuine commercial risk. According to the
Supreme Court's latest exposition of the sham doctrine, "even a
'major motive' " to mitigate one's taxes "will not vitiate an otherwise substantial transaction." 27
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Maysteel Products, Inc. v.
Commissioner28 clarifies the contours of the beneficial interest
standard. Maysteel bought $100,000 in bonds, financing the purchase through a promissory note. The corporation amortized the
bond premium and deducted the amortization from its return. A
month later Maysteel donated the bonds, subject to its indebtedness, to a charitable foundation. The foundation sold them at an
appreciated value while Maysteel claimed a charitable deduction. The Commissioner contested the amortization deduction,
claiming that the bond purchase was a sham transaction "outside
the plain intent of the statute. " 29 The court allowed the deduction, responding:
While the end result here was a gift - not a business transaction
- the bond purchase, loan, note or pledge of collateral, sale of
bonds, and satisfaction of the loan were in every respect genuine
financial and commercial transactions. They were real in every
sense. And the taxpayer was exposed to all of the usual risks involved in such transactions. It incurred genuine obligations; risks
and obligations beyond its control. . . . Taxpayer incurred the
risk of loss in event of decline in the market; was entitled to benefit
from any advance; it was not bound to make the gift it ultimately
did but could have retained the benefits of the transaction. 30
26. Rothschild v. United States, 407 F.2d 404, 408 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
27. United States v. Consumer Life Ins. Co., 430 U.S. 725, 739 (1977). See also
Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960).
28. 287 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1968). For other cases applying the beneficial interest test,
see Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563 (1965); Blueberry Land Co. v. Commissioner,
361 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1966); Halle v. United States, 346 F.2d 543 (4th Cir. 1965); Humphreys v. Commissioner, 301 F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1962); Evans v. Dudley, 295 F.2d 713 (3d
Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 909 (1962); Fabreeka Prods. Co. v. Commissioner, 294
F.2d 876 (1st Cir. 1961); Diggs v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 326 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 264
U.S. 908 (1960); Granite Trust Co. v. United States, 238 F.2d 670 (1st Cir. 1956); L. Lee
Stanton, 34 T.C. 1 (1960). When it approved the holding in Granite Trust, the Service
apparently embraced the notion that the taxpayer's motive is irrelevant if the transaction
affects a beneficial interest. Rev. Rul. 78-285, 1978-2 C.B. 6.
29. 287 F.2d at 430.
30. 287 F.2d at 431.
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Hence, the beneficial interest test winnows out only those commercial schemes that create no risks or cause no substantive
change in the taxpayer's position. 31
The second approach courts take when deciding whether a
transaction is a sham hinges upon the taxpayer's motivation. 32
Although the Gregory Court conceded that taxpayers have a legal
right to reduce their taxes, it also held that a legitimate corporate
reorganization must have a nontax purpose. Courts using the
motive test have interpreted Gregory to mean that transactions
solely or substantially motivated by tax considerations should be
disregarded for tax purposes.33
The holding of the court in Brooke v. United States 34 illustrates the motive test. Brooke, a doctor, gave an office building
to his children, holding and renting it as their guardian. The
Commissioner challenged the transfer as a sham and refused to
recognize the father's rent deductions, alleging that Brooke conveyed the building only to gain those deductions. The taxpayer
presented a lengthy list of nontax motives for the transaction: to
provide for the health and education of his children through the
rent received in trust; to avoid friction with his partners in medical practice; to insulate assets from the threat of a malpractice
suit; and to diminish the ethical problem stemming from his
31. As applied in Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), the beneficial interest is
deceptively simple. The Gregory Court nullified the tax effects of a transaction that
involved no significant business risks. After stating that a reorganization required a business purpose in order to avoid recognition, the Court reasoned that no such purpose was
present because the new corporation undertook no substantive transactions.
32. It would be misleading, however, to suggest that courts applying the motive test
will not also consider the risks involved in the transaction. On the other hand, courts using
the beneficial interest test are not above peeking at the taxpayer's motives. Indeed, the
varied interpretations of the Gregory holding led two commentators to state that the
decision is "all things to all men." B. Bl'ITKER & L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME ESTATE AND
G1IT TAXATION 739 (4th ed. 1972). See also Blum, Knetsch v. United States: A Pronouncement on Tax Avoidance, 1961 SUP. CT. REv. 135, 140. Most courts apply the motive test
where the transaction they wish to invalidate has commercial substance. For a more
thorough discussion of the interrelationship between the two standards, see Gunn, Tax
Avoidance, 76 MICH. L. REv. 733 (1978); Blum, Motive, Intent, and Purpose in Federal
Income Taxation, 34 U. Cm. L. REV. 485 (1967); Fuller, Business Purpose, Sham Transac- .
tions and the Relation of Private Law to the Law of Taxation, 37 TuL. L. REV. 355 (1963).
33. For courts applying the motive standard, see Barnett v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d
742 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967); Kocin v. United States, 187 F.2d
707 (2d Cir. 1951); Slifka v. Commissioner, 182 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1950). Courts using the
motive test are in a definite minority. Furthermore, the doctrine has recently come under
criticism. According to Gunn, "the question whether particular conduct was taxmotivated should be irrelevant to the decision whether that conduct should be taxed in a
certain way." Gunn, supra note 32, at 765.
34. 468 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1972).
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ownership of a medical practice in the building in which one of
the tenants was a pharmacy. 35 The court stated that "a transfer
solely to avoid taxes will not be recognized" but held that
Brooke's gift was not a sham since "[t]he non-tax motives, as
borne out by the record, are abundant and grounded in economic
reality. " 36
Revenue Ruling 76-255 seeks to apply the sham doctrine to
divorce procedures. To support that ruling, the IRS bears a heavy
burden, for Gregory and its successors have applied the doctrine
only in cases where it is essential to protect a clear legislative
purpose. 37 The remainder of this Note demonstrates that any
strong legislative desires are opposed to federalizing divorce law,
that the most plausible goal protected by applying sham doctrine
to year-end divorces - taxation of married couples at a higher
rate than individuals - is not a clear congressional desire, and
that neither of the two sham doctrine tests are tailored to analyze
the year-end divorce situation.
II.

THE FEDERAL

TAX LAWS, STATE MARRIAGE LAWS,

AND CONGRESSIONAL INTENT

Gregory authorizes a court to declare a formally valid commercial transaction invalid for tax purposes whenever the beneficial interest test or the motive test reveals that the transaction is
not one .that Congress intended the relevant Code provision to
cover. Under Revenue Ruling 76-255, 38 the Internal Revenue Service has chosen to use Gregory to challenge year-end divorce and
remarriage schemes. This Section probes two necessary assumptions that the Service must make about congressional intent before it can invoke Gregory: that Congress intended to create a
federal marital status independent of state laws, and that Congress had a clear purpose to impose a marriage penalty. If the
35. 468 F.2d at 1158.
36. 468 F.2d at 1158.
37. Courts impose this heavy burden on the IRS in sham cases because the Service
challenges transactions that comply with the letter of the tax statutes. See Rice, Judicial
Techniques in Combating Tax Avoidance, 51 Mica. L. REV. 1021 (1953). The challenged
transaction's literal conformance to the applicable statute requires the IRS to demonstrate, as the Court held in Gregory v. Helvering, that "the transaction upon its face lies
outside the plain intent of the statute." 293 U.S. at 470. Consistent with the Gregory
holding, many courts have stated that "unless Congress makes it abundantly clear," tax
statutes should not be construed to "be dependent upon the discovery of a purpose, or a
state of mind . . . ." Fabreeka Prods. Co. v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 876, 878 (1st Cir.
1961). See also Henry McK. Haserot, 41 T.C. 562, 571 (1964).
38. Rev. Rul. 76-255, 1976-2 C.B. 40.
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Service cannot support both assumptions, it will not have met the
sham doctrine's requirement of a clear congressional purpose, and
enforcement of Revenue Ruling 76-255 must fail.
A. State Law and the Marital Status Provisions

of the Revenue Code
Given the intimate relationship between state law and the
institution of marriage, 39 it is not surprising that courts have always used state law to determine marital status under the federal
tax laws. 40 Before Congress adopted the 1954 Internal Revenue
Code, courts consistently held that state law defined marital
status for deductions and for eligibility to file joint returns. In
the most cited decision, Marriner S. Eccles, 41 Mrs. Eccles
filed for divorce in Utah and received an interlocutory decree
on August 2, 1949, that became absolute in February of 1950.
Mr. Eccles filed a joint return42 for 1949, and the Commissioner
challenged it, arguing that the interlocutory decree had legally
separated the parties. The court held that under Utah law the
interlocutory d~cree did not "end the matrimonial status of the
parties, nor destroy the economic and social incidents inherent
in marriage." 43 To complete its syllogism and reject the Commissioner's view, the court held that state law determined the
couple's marital status for tax purposes:
39. In Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-35 (1877), the Court stated: "The State . . .
has absolute right to prescribe the conditions upon which the marriage relation between
its own citizens shall be created, and the causes for which it may be dissolved."
In Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 584 (1858), the Court stated, "We disclaim altogether any jurisdiction in the courts of the United States upon the subject of
divorce." See also Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 167 (1899).
40. It is well settled that state law does not, by its own force, control the application
of federal tax provisions. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has held that state law may
control where the federal statute, by necessary implication, depends upon it. Barnet v.
Harmel, 287 U.S. 101, 110 (1932). See also Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188, 194 (1938); Cahn,
Local Law in Federal Taxation, 52 YALE L.J. 799, 816 (1943). Courts can dra\\- the necessary implication that marital status under state law is controlling for tax purposes because
the legislative history of the predecessors of § 6013 and § 143 of the 1954 Code - 26
U.S.C. § 51(b)(1939) and 26 U.S.C. § 23(aa)(6)(1948) - shows no evidence that Congress
intended to create an independent federal law to govern marital status.
41. Marriner S. Eccles, 19 T.C. 1049, nonacq. 1953-2 C.B. 8, affd. per curiam, 208
F.2d 796 (4th Cir. 1953). For other cases following Eccles, see Commissioner v. Ostler, 237
F.2d 501 (9th Cir. 1956); Holcomb v. United States, 137 F. Supp. 619 (N.D. Cal. 1955),
affd., 237 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1956); Alice Humphrey Evans, 19 T.C. 1102 (1953), nonacq.
1953-2 C.B. 8, affd., 211 F.2d 378 (10th Cir. 1954).
42. At the time, the joint return provision was § 51 of the 1939 Code, Int. Rev. Code
of 1939, ch. 1, § 51, 53 Stat. 27, as amended by Act of Oct. 20, 1951, Pub. L. No. 81-183,
ch. 521, § 312, 65 Stat. 452, 488 (current version at I.R.C. § 6013).
43. Marriner S. Eccles, 19 T.C. at 1051.
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Subsection (b)(5)(B) of section 51 [states] "an individual who is
legally separated from his spouse under a decree of divorce or of
separate maintenance shall not be considered as married," for purposes of filing a joint return.
It is plain that whether the petitioner here meets the basic test
imposed by the language set forth above depends upon his marital
status as determined by state law for the marital relation. Marriage, its existence and dissolution, is particularly within the province of the states. 44

After Congress enacted the 1954 Code, courts had to decide
whether the new marital status provisions of sections 143 and
6013 also looked to state law. 45 Most concluded that Congress
intended state law to control marital status under the revised
Code, apparently finding that Eccles court's reasoning still persuasive. ~6 Of course, where local authorities disagreed about the
validity of a couple's divorce decree, federal courts had to look
beyond provincial law; 47 at the very least, they had to choose
which state's laws to respect.
General Counsel Memorandum 2525048 was the first IRS
opinion to address the problem of choosing among conflicting
determinations of marital status by different jurisdictions. In the
memorandum case, the husband and wife divorced in Mexico
during 1935. The husband made alimony payments as prescribed
by a previously signed separation agreement. In 1943, the wife,
44. 19 T.C. at 1051. See also J.R. Calhoun, Jr., 27 T.C. 115 (1956).
45. The legislative history of § 6013 and § 143 provides little assistance for this
endeavor. The committee reports accompanying the 1954 Code indicate generally that
Congress made no substantive change in the marital status provisions of the 1939 Code.
See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d. Sess., reprinted in [1954] U.S. CoDE CoNo. &
AD. NEWS 4025, 4176, 4543; S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d. Sess., reprinted in [1954]
U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEWS 4621, 4827, 5211; and note 40 supra.
46. The reasoning in Lee v. Commissioner is typical:
[W]e must face the question whether for Federal income tax purposes the term
"husband and wife" is to be construed with reference to State law governing the
definition and characterization of marital relationships, or whether Congress in•
tended some nationwide, Federal standard under which a couple could be "husband and wife" for purposes of section 6013 even if under the laws of their particular
State they would not have that status. This Court has continuously held that for
purposes of section 6013 and other Code provisions the marital status, its existence
and dissolution, is defined by State rather than Federal laws.
64 T.C. 552, 556 (1975). For a similar view, see John T. Untermann, 38 T.C. 93 (1962).
47. Outside of the conflicts cases, one decision exists denying the conclusiveness of
state court determinations of marital status. In Daine v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 449 (2d
Cir. 1948), the Second Circuit held that a state's retroactive judgment of divorce would
not affect the marital status of the individual for tax purposes in the prior years.
48. G.C.M. 25250, 1947-2 C.B. 32.
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following advice that her divorce would probably not be recognized in a state court, obtained a second divorce in Nevada. The
issue was whether the alleged invalidity of the Mexican decree
disqualified the husband's alimony deductions 49 taken prior to
the Nevada divorce. Even though the Chief Counsel considered
it "unlikely" that the couple's state of marital domicile would
recognize the Mexican decree, he opined that the deductions were
within "the general intent of Congress in enacting" the alimony
provisions of the 1939 Code. 50 The memo indicated that the couple's "good faith" reliance on the Mexican decree would bring the
alimony deductions within the intent of Congress. 51
The Third Circuit followed General Counsel Memorandum
25250 in Feinberg v. Commissioner, 52 where a New York court
invalidated a Florida divorce and the Commissioner disallowed
the husband's alimony deduction. The Feinberg court upheld the
deduction, claiming that the "mere fact that the marital domicile
of the parties [New York] did not recognize the Florida divorce
does not render it a nullity for Federal income tax purposes. " 53
The court noted that, as in General Counsel Memorandum 25250,
the husband had relied on the foreign decree. 54
Both Feinberg and the General Counsel Memorandum lay
dormant for over a decade until the Second Circuit decided
Estate of Borax v. Commissioner. 55 Herman Borax had obtained
a Mexican divorce on August 7, 1952, and remarried later that
month. His first wife challenged the divorce in New York, their
domicile, and received a decree of invalidation in February 1953.
The Commissioner claimed that Herman and his second wife
were not legally married and therefore could not file a joint return. The Second Circuit held that, for tax purposes, the Mexican
divorce was controlling:
49. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, §§ 22(k), 23(u), added by Act of Oct. 21, 1942,
Pub. L. No. 77-753, ch. 619, § 120, 56 Stat. 798,816 (current versions at I.R.C. §§ 71,215).
50. G.C.M. 25250, supra note 48, at 33.
51. Id. The Service cited H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1942), reprinted
in 1942-2 C.B. 372, as evidence that Congress considered good faith reliance a factor in
determining marital status for tax purposes. However, an examination of the sections of
the report that discuss marital status provisions does not indicate the specific method by
which Congress intended marital status to be determined. See 1942-2 C.B. 409-10, 42729.
52. 198 F.2d 260 (3d Cir. 1952).
53. 198 F.2d at 263.
54. 198 F.2d at 263.
55. 349 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 935 (1966). Later the same year,
the Second Circuit followed Borax in Wondsel v. Commissioner, 350 F.2d 339 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 935 (1966).

1342

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 77:1332

[F]or purposes of these provisions of the federal tax statute, and
within the meaning of these provisions, . . . for the years in dispute Ruth and Herman were divorced under a decree of divorce.
The subsequent declaration of invalidity by a jurisdiction other
than the one that decreed the divorce is of no consequence under
these provisions of tax law. 58

The court cited two justifications for respecting the issuing
jurisdiction's judgment of validity of a divorce decree. The first
was the need for a uniform determination of marital status under
the federal tax laws. The court noted that rote reliance upon state
law to determine marital status breaks down when a divorce decree is considered valid by one jurisdiction and invalid by another. 57 It stated that "the Supreme Court is not in a position to
resolve all such sister-state conflicts . . . and it would not be
advisable for this court (or the Tax Court) to attempt such a
resolution in these most collateral tax-deficiency proceedings. " 0H
Therefore, the court held that
the rule of validation avoids a measure of unevenness and uncertainty: all those taxpayers who have obtained a divorce in a particular jurisdiction are treated the same, regardless of whether the
spouse against whom the divorce has been obtained is able to, and
does, invoke the power of another jurisdiction to declare that divorce invalid. 59

As its second justification for recognizing the Mexican
divorce, the Borax court adopted the reliance reasoning of Feinberg60 and General Counsel Memorandum 25250: for all practical
purposes, Herman and his first spouse were divorced - they
had ceased living together, and Herman had in good faith sought
and received a decree of divorce. 61 The Borax court held that to
upset these "pre-existing arrangements" would be contrary to
56. 349 F.2d at 670.
57. The Borax court relied on the Nevada Supreme Court decision in Colby v. Colby,
78 Nev. 150, 369 P.2d 1019, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 888 (1962). In Colby, the wife received
a Nevada divorce. Her husband went to Maryland and received an invalidation decree
from the Maryland court. The husband then returned to Nevada to nullify the Nevada
decree. The Nevada court denied relief, stating that it would not give "greater credit and
respect" to a foreign decree than to a lawfully entered decree in its own state. 78 Nev. at
157, 369 P.2d at 1023. The Colby facts illustrate how a couple can be considered married
in one jurisdiction and divorced in another. While most courts have accepted the validity
of the Colby holding, at least one article has questioned its constitutionality. See Spolter,
Invalid Divorce Decree, 24 TAX L. REv. 163, 193-96 (1969).
58. 349 F.2d at 670.
59. 349 F.2d at 670.
60. 198 F.2d at 260.
61. 349 F.2d at 670-71.
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congressional desires. 62
Although the two Borax arguments - uniformity and reliance - convincingly demonstrate that some choice of state law
must be made, they do not necessarily explain why the law of the
issuing jurisdiction is the best law to use. At least superficially,
it would appear that consistent reliance on the law of a couple's
marital domicile would serve those policy goals just as well as
reliance on the law of the issuing jurisdiction. 63 fudeed, ten years
after Borax the Second Circuit severely limited that opinion's
scope in Estate of Goldwater v. Commissioner. 64 Goldwater
looked to the law of the marital domicile, holding that the Borax
rule applied only to the Code sections relating to alimony deductions. 65 But while the Borax-Goldwater debate continues within
and without the Second Circuit, both sides agree to a principle
of supreme importance to the sham doctrine question: there is no
federal law of marriage and divorce. 66 The federal courts always
62. 349 F.2d at 671. The Borax opinion also contained dicta suggesting the possibility
of federal procedural standards for determining the tax validity of a divorce. The Second
Circuit noted that the Mexican concept of a divorce, although it had extreme elements,
was not "totally alien to that contemplated by the tax laws." 349 F.2d at 672. The court
indicated that in particularly unusual divorce proceedings, the question was not whether
the foreign divorce would be "declared invalid in every state" but rather whether the
divorce frustrated the tax laws. 349 F.2d at 673.
Several commentators have concluded that Borax spawned a federal law of marriage
and divorce for tax purposes. See generally Fried, External Pressures on Internal Revenue:
The Effect of State Court Adjudications in Tax Litigation, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 647, 653
(1967); Rodgers & Rodgers, The Disparity Between Due Process and Full Faith and
Credit: The Problem of the Somewhere Wife, 67 CoLUM. L. REV. 1363, 1385 (1967); Spalter,
supra note 57. One article has argued that Borax did not create a federal tax law of marital
relations. See Note, 9 CoNN. L. REV. 282, 287 (1977).
63. In fact, the majority of courts facing the Borax problem have turned to the law
of the couple's domicile instead of the issuing jurisdiction to determine a couple's marital
status. See, e.g., Capodanno v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 638 (1978); Irving A. Sheppard,
32 T.C. 942 (1959). See also cases cited in note 40 supra.
64. 539 F.2d 878 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1023 (1976).
65. 539 F.2d at 881. Goldwater may be the death knell for the Borax rule. The court
in Goldwater declared that "Borax was concerned with the provisions of the federal income tax law concerning the deductibility of alimony payments. The court carefully so
limited its holding." 539 F.2d at 881. Therefore, the Goldwater court did not feel bound
to apply Borax to a surviving spouse deduction in § 2057 of the Code. The Borax opinion,
however, does not appear limited to alimony deductions. The Borax court was concerned
with a " 'uniform construction' " of the marital status provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code. 349 F .2d at 675. By limiting Borax to a particular section of the Code, the Goldwater
decision overlooked one of the major justifications the Borax court relied on for its rule of
validation - a uniform marital status standard under the Code.
66. As Judge Friendly noted in his Borax dissent, although the court was divided on
the holding, the judges all agreed that federal courts should not "set themselves up as
domestic relations tribunals." 349 F.2d at 676.
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accept the view of some other jurisdiction, state or foreign; they
do not sua sponte invalidate state divorce decrees in "these most
collateral tax deficiency proceedings." 67
In Revenue Ruling 76-255, the IRS argues that a couple may
comply with formal state requirements for divorce, yet continue
to live in a inanner so indistinguishable from marriage that the
divorce decree should be disregarded for tax purposes. 68 But a
federal court that unilaterally invalidated a state divorce decree
would create an independent federal law of marriage. Courts
since Eccles have always interpreted the marriage provisions of
the Code to avoid such a consequence. Since Congress has never
indicated that it wants to ignore state divorce decrees, the implicit IRS assumption of a clear congressional purpose is cryptic.
B. The "Marriage Penalty" and Congressional Purpose
Even if Congress did desire the courts to fashion a federal law
of marital status wholly independent of state laws, Gregory requires a more specific congressional purpose before the sham doctrine is appropriate. The Service is likely to argue that Congress
thought that the "marriage penalty" was a necess1:1:ry evil to institute more equitable tax rates for single persons. But that alone
is surely not a sufficiently specific purpose to warrant the use of
the sham doctrine. 69 On the other hand, the Service might argue
that Congress wanted to iax all married couples in which both
spouses earn significant incomes at a higher rate than similarly
situated single couples and that the sham doctrine is the only
feasible way to v~dicate that goal. To see whether that goal takes
a form clear enough
to justify the extraordinary measures of
,,
67. 349 F.2d at 670.
68. An argument by the Commissioner for federal standards to determine marital
status under the Code may place the Service in an embarrassing position. After the Borax
decision, the IRS repudiated it in Rev. Rul. 67-442. According to the Ruling, the Commissioner:
generally will not question for Federal income tax purposes the validity of any
divorce decree until a court of competent jurisdiction declares the divorce to be
invalid. . . . In this regard the Service will not follow the decisions in Estate of
Herman Borax v. Commissioner and Harold E. Wondsel v. Commissioner. , . ,
G.C.M. 25250 is clarified to remove any possible implication that the Service
will follow invalidated divorce decrees for Federal income tax purposes.
1967-2 C.B. 65, 66.
Of course, neither the courts nor the Service are bound by the Revenue Ruling, Estate
of Lang v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 404, 406-07 (1975). Unfortunately for the Commissioner, however, the courts have given Rev. Rul. 67-442 "general applicability." Wilson
v. Commissioner, 35 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec, 1276, 1279 (1976).
69. See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
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Gregory v. Helvering, one must review the development of the tax
laws and the confused legislative history of the 1969 Tax Reform
Act.
The tax laws have always sought to treat individuals with
equal incomes equally. 70 The Revenue Act of 1913 contained only
one schedule, which applied to all individuals. 71 Similarly, the
first joint return provision, passed in 1918, set forth one rate for
all married couples, whether they filed separately or jointly. 72 In
the 1930s, Congress noticed that married couples living in common law states were taxed at a higher rate than those living in
community property states. 73 Community property statutes split
a married couple's income equally between each spouse, no matter how much each spouse earned, and spared the couple's high
earner some of the pains of progressive taxation. Desiring to tax
all couples equally, regardless of their states of residence, Congress enacted a provision in 1948 allowing all married couples
filing a joint return to be taxed at rates that were twice what a
single person earning one-half of the couple's joint income would
pay. 74 By setting joint rates on a par with the rates paid in the
community property states, Congress gave all married couples
the advantages of income splitting. The plan admirably served
one congressional purpose - equal taxation of all couples, regardless of state of residency. Moreover, for couples in which
both spouses earn equal incomes, it ensured equal taxes for all
individuals, regardless of marital status. But it created a new
discrepancy: a married individual whose spouse earned no
income was now taxed at a much lower rate than a single
individual. Not surprisingly, single workers cried "Foul!"
In 1969, Congress responded to the demands of single taxpayers by reducing their rates so that an individual would never pay
more than one hundred twenty percent of the taxes paid by a
married person with the same income. 75 Standing alone, such a
70. See generally Jensen, The Historical Discrimination of the Federal Income Tax
Rates, 54 TAXES 445, 452 (1976).
71. Tariff of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 166-81.
72. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 223, 40 Stat. 1057, 1074 (1919).
73. See Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389,
1400-09 (1975); Note, Federal Income Tax Discrimination Between Married and Single
Taxpayers, 7 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 667, 672-74 (1974).
74. Revenue Act of 1945, Pub. L. No. 80-471, ch. 168, § 301, 3 Stat. 110, 114. The
Senate Finance Committee Report on the 1948 Revenue Act states that the adoption of
the Act "will produce substantial geographical equalization in the impact of the tax on
individual incomes." S. REP. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 25 (1948).
75. S. REP. No. 91-552, supra note 2.
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change would have allowed couples in community property states
to file separately under the new individual rates and pay less tax
than similar couples in common law states. Careful to avoid recreating such a disparity, Congress qualified the 1969 amendment with a rule that married couples co"Qld file separately only
if they used the pre-1969 individual rates. 76 That rule successfully
averted the common-law/ community-property disparity but
inadvertently created the "marriage penalty."
As other commentators have explained, 77 the problem is one
of irreconcilable goals. Under a progressive tax structure, it is
impossible to
1) Tax all married couples equally, regardless of the distribution
of income within the couple (the goal of the 1948 reform),
2) Tax all single individuals at a rate little higher than the rate
applied to an individual earning the same income but married to
a nonearning spouse (the goal of the 1969 reform), and,
3) Tax all married couples at rates no higher than they would
face if they were single (the avoidance of a "marriage penalty").

To justify the use of the sham doctrine, the IRS might argue that
the steps Congress took in 1969 to protect the first and second
goals imply a clear desire to overrule the third. Such reasoning
would have merit if at the time of its actions Congress understood
all the implications. Such is not the case. 78 During the 1972
House Ways and Means Committee Hearings testimony diverged
over Congress's knowledge of the existence of the marriage
penalty when it passed the 1969 Tax Reform Act. New York
Representative Bella Abzug testified: "The problem of the
working married couple who must pay higher taxes than two
single working pe_ople living together appears to be the result of
an oversight in the drafting of the Tax Reform Act of 1969."79
On the other hand, Iowa Representative Fred Schwengel testified, "This so-called 'marriage penalty' was noted by the tax
writing committees at the time, but it was justified on the

76. See Bittker, supra note 73, at 1429.
77. See id. at 1430; Hearings, supra note 3, at 78-95 (statement of Edwin S. Cohen).
78. As one author stated:
[T]he historical development of the current tax rate structure raises significant
doubt that the discrimination between married and single taxpayers is indicative
of any conscious congressional plan or policy. Rather, it appears that the present
allocation of tax burdens is the unintended and conglomerate result of a series of
ad hoc congressional reactions to public pressure.
Note, supra note 73, at 678.
79. Hearings, supra note 3, at 122 (statement of Representative Abzug).
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grounds that a couple's living expenses are likely to be less than
those of two single persons. " 80
The legislative history of the 1969 Tax Reform Act supports
the former view, if it supports either. The Senate Report that
accompanied the Act81 is devoid of reference to a marriage penalty. If such a consequence were fully intended, the absence of
either justification or dissent would be difficult to explain. 82
Surely Congress would have recorded any clear desire to impose
so controversial a measure as the marriage penalty. 83
But must we not presume that Congress intended all the
necessary consequences of its actions? Perhaps. Yet we need not
presume so strong an intent that courts should take extraordinary
measures to vindicate it. In light of the provision's complete hisBO. Hearings, supra note 3, at 100 (statement of Representative Schwengel).
81. S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
82. The General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, written by the staff of
the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, is the only document related to the
Act that mentions the marriage penalty. However, by its own admission, the General
Explanation is not a statement of congressional intent but
attempt by the staff to
write the equivalent of what it believes would be the type of explanation which might have
been prepared with respect to the legislation as finally enacted if the legislative process
called for such an explanation." STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION,
91ST CONG., lsT SESs., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM Acr OF 1969, at III (Dec.
3, 1970). Hence the document is nothing more than an after-the-fact justification of the
effect of the Act. Furthermore, the General Explanation's reference to the marriage penalty suggests Congress was unaware of its existence at the time it passed the Act:
With the new rate schedule for single persons, married couples filing a joint return
will pay more tax than two single persons with the same total income. This is a
necessary result of changing the income-splitting relationship between single and
joint returns. Moreover, it is justified on the grounds that although a married couple
has greater living expenses than a single person and hence should pay less tax, the
couple's living expenses are likely to be less than those of two single persons and
therefore the couple's tax should be higher than that of two single persons.
Id. at 223. A statement of justification normally presupposes the author's knowledge of
the condition justified. However, the term "moreover" indicates that Congress did not
contemplate the living expense justification for the marriage tax when it passed the Act.
Instead, it appears that the drafters of the General Explanation constructed what they
felt to be a reasonable explanation for the enigmatic imposition of the marriage tax.
83. The 1978 Revenue Act, Pub. L. No. 96-600, § 101, 92 Stat. 2763, 2767 (current
version at I.R.C. § 1), revised tax rates for married couples as well as single individuals,
thereby reducing the "marriage tax." For example, prior to the 1978 revisions if each
spouse earned $15,000, the couple would pay $1205 more than their single counterparts.
Under the 1978 Act the marriage tax would be approximately $957, or about $248 less.
Regrettably, the reports accompanying the 1978 Act do not specify whether Congress
intended to reduce the disparity between dual-earning couples and single taxpayers. If
anything, the revision indicates that Congress was displeased with the marriage penalty
it had imposed nine years earlier. If Congress lacked sufficient intent to fortify the marriage tax with the sham doctrine in 1969, it would be difficult to construe the 1978 Act as
evidencing a stronger intent to do so.

"an
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tory, Congress's silence concerning the marriage penalty, and the
presumption against creating a federal law of marriage, it seems
inappropriate to take the commercial sham doctrine and apply it
to year-end divorces.
III.

THE YEAR-END DIVORCE AND THE SUITABILITY

OF SHAM DOCTRINE TESTS

Even if one were to conclude that year-end divorces undermine a congressional purpose, one must still ask whether, given
the personal and intimate character of marriage and divorce, the
sham doctrine is an appropriate tool to achieve that purpose. In
the past, courts have employed the doctrine to assess the tax
consequences of business transactions. The remarks of the Second Circuit are typical: "The doctrine of Gregory v. Helvering
means that in construing words of a tax statute which describe
commercial or industrial transactions we are to understand them
to refer to transactions entered upon for commercial or industrial
purposes . . . . " 84 Should this commercial doctrine be transplanted to the family setting? The answer should certainly turn
in part on whether either of the current sham doctrine tests are
properly tailored to separate cases that violate congressional purposes from cases that do not.
A.

The Beneficial Interest Test

It is not at all clear that courts using the beneficial interest
test would ever strike down a year-end divorce and remarriage as
a sham. Unlike those commercial transactions that courts have
found not to change a taxpayer's position significantly, dissolution of marriage always carries significant risks that are largely
beyond the couple's control. In many regions of the country and
many social circles, divorce still carries a powerful stigma. That
stigma may impair social relations with family, close friends, or
the community at large; for some it may even impair job oppor84. Commissioner v. Transport Trading & Term. Corp., 176 F.2d 570, 572 (2d Cir.
1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 955 (1950). At least one court, however, has suggested that
the sham doctrine is applicable to domestic relations. In Chisholm v. Commissioner,
Learned Hand stated that in sham cases:
The question always is whether the transaction under scrutiny is in fact what it
appears to be in form; a marriage may be a joke; a contract may be intended only
to deceive others; an agreement may have a collateral defeasance. In such cases the
transaction as a whole is different from its appearance.
79 F.2d 14, 15 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 641 (1935).
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tunities. More significantly for the purposes of the beneficial interest test, year-end divorce and remarriage imposes several inescapable financial risks, most of which are tied to the possibility
that one or both partners might die or become incompetent during the period of separation. If one spouse dies intestate during
some excessive New Year's festivities, the•other will be without
the statutory protections accorded a surviving spouse. 85 Even if
both spouses made wills before the divorce, an untimely death
during the separation can have many undesired effects on the
legal dissolution of the estate, 86 including forfeiture of the estatetax marital deduction87 and in some jurisdictions automatic revocation of all bequests to the divorced spouse. 88 Finally, each party
to a year-end divorce runs a personal risk that should not be
ignored: the partner may enjoy being divorced fnd choose not to
remarry. This risk is not easily quantified, and for some marriages
a disinterested spectator might well characterize it as a possible
fringe benefit, but it must surely play some role in the parties'
decision to proceed with their plan.
Of course, one might say that such risks make it clear that
the year-end scheme is not in the "beneficial interest" of the
parties when the tax consequences are not considered. But as we
saw in the commercial setting, 89 the test is intended to weed out
only those transactions that are not "significant." The courts do
not step in and decide whether the parties were wise; they only
decide whether the risks were so insignificant that the parties
never moved their eyes from the Internal Revenue Code. It is hard
to imagine any year-end divorce and remarriage fitting that de~
scription.
85. See, e.g., UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-102.
86. It will not help the Service if the Court limits its evaluation of the risks attendant
to a divorce to financial considerations. Perhaps even more significant than the social
col\l!equences of a divorce are the economic ones. If the couple does not remarry, they may
lose the benefits of spousal insurance policies and social security benefits. Property held
by tenancy in the entirety may become a tenancy in common. Although some of these risks
might be reduced by contracts prior to the year-end divorce, many - such as federal
benefits - cannot be controlled. For a general discussion of some of the economic risks
in a year-end divorce, see Feld, Divorce, Tax-Style, 54 TAXES 608, 610 (1976).
87. I.R.C. § 2056.
88. See, e.g., UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-508. Even in those states without statutory
revocation provisions, a divorce greatly magnifies the threat of a will contest by other
devisees of the will. See, e.g., In re Estate of Blanchard, 391 Mich. 644, 218
N.W.2d 37 (1974); Caswell v. Kent, 158 Me. 493, 186 A.2d 581 (1962). For a general
discussion and collection of cases concerning the effects of divorce on a will, see R. WELLMAN, L. WAGGONER & 0. BROWDER, PALMER'S TRusTS & SuccESSIONs.231-48 (3d ed. 1978).
89. See text at notes 24-31 supra.
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B. The Motive Test
The beneficial interest test is objectionable because there
may be no year-end divorce and remarriage schemes that would
violate its standards. In contrast, the motive test would surely
strike down some such schemes. Nonetheless, the motive test
may still not be an appropriate way to vindicate a congressional
desire to impose a marriage penalty.
The motive test is invasive. It requires a court to probe the
desires of an individual by seeking circumstantial evidence of
purpose. In a commercial context, courts have tolerated the test
where that evidence was easily obtained. In Gregory, for example,
the Supreme Court found the reorganization to be tax-motivated
by exploring the business records of Averill and discovering that
the company performed no business functions and served no economic purpose apart from gaining a tax benefit. 90 But when the
circumstances are murkier, courts have shunned motive investigations even in commercial contexts. In Granite Trust Co. v.
United States, 91 a corporate taxpayer wanted to liquidate a
wholly owned subsidiary. To ensure that the liquidation would
not create a nonrecognizable loss under section 112(b) of the 1939
Code92 or section 332 of the 1954 Code, 93 the company reduced its
ownership to less than 80% by selling shares to friends who knew
the company would be liquidated. The IRS challenged the transaction as circuitous and without "independent purpose," but the
First Circuit held otherwise:
To strike down these sales on the alleged defect that they took
place between friends and for tax motives would only tend to promote duplicity and result in extensive litigation as taxpayers led
courts into hairsplitting investigations to decide when a sale was
not a sale. It is no answer to argue that, under Gregory v. Helvering, there is an inescapable judicial duty to examine into the actuality of purported corporate reorganizations, for that was a special sort of transaction, whose bona fides could readily be ascertained by inquiring whether the ephemeral new corporation was in
fact transacting business, or whether there was in fact a continuance of the proprietary interests under an altered corporate form. 0j

It is difficult to imagine a more hair-splitting investigation

IN

90. As one author noted, the facts in Gregory were "entirely clear." R. PAUL, STUDIES
FEDERAL TAXATION 152 (1937).
91. 238 F.2d 670 (1st Cir. 1956).
92. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 112(b), 53 Stat. 36.
93. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 1, § 332, 68 Stat. 102.
94. 238 F.2d at 677-78.
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than one to seek the impetus behind a valid divorce. One commentator has described the factual problems in adversarial divorce litigation in a manner that illuminates the even greater
difficulties present here: "Truth is not discernible in a divorce
case since the factual history of a crumbling marriage is usually
too complex to allow the assessment of facts in terms of truth or
untruth. " 95 But at least in divorce litigation, the parties with
access to the information are opposed, and therefore have incentives to present evidence on both sides of disputed issues. In tax
litigation, the parties have no incentive to go beyorid presentation
of the state decree of divorce and any evidence they may have
produced to gain that decree. 98
Possibly out of sensitivity to these problems, the Commissioner seems to have set a limit to the types of year-end divorces
the IRS will challenge. In Letter Ruling 7835076, 97 a couple asked
the Service whether it would challenge a purely tax-motivated
divorce where the parties continued to cohabit but did not remarry. Although the Commissioner noted that the only change in
the couple's lives would be a purely legal one, he stated that the
Service would not challenge the divorce. 98 That position is reassuring, but it draws a line that is not defensible as an expression
of the motive test's standards to advance a congressional purpose.
If Congress wanted the IRS to apply a sham doctrine motive test
95. Feldman, A Statutory Proposal to Remove Divorce from the Courtroom, 29 ME.
L. REV. 25, 31 (1977).
.
96. In states where grounds are required, the decree would evidence the existence of
other motivations for the divorce besides a reduction of taxes. Even no-fault states require
a demonstration that " 'there has been a breakdown. of the marriage relationship to the
extent that the legitimate objects of marriage have been destroyed and there remains no
reasonable likelihood that the marriage can be preserved' " before a court grants a decree
of divorce. Raphael, Frank, & Wilder, Divorce in America: The Erosion of Fault, 81 DICK.
L. REV. 719, 729 (1977).
An interesting question is whether the courts will extend the general presumptions
presently enjoyed by the Commissioner to ease the difficulty of proof for the Service, and
if so, what weight the courts will give the valid state decree. Case law demonstrates two
burden-shifting devices. The first is the general rule that the Commissioner "has the
support of a presumption of correctness, and the petitioner [taxpayer] has the burden of
proving it to be wrong." Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). This presumption
has been extended by some courts to sham questions. For example, see Hoffman Motors
Corp. v. United States, 473 F.2d 254,_258 (2d Cir. 1973). The second doctrine that may
benefit the Service is that transactions between family members which reduce taxes are
subject to strict scrutiny. See Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 335 (1940); Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 291 (1946). However, because year-end divorces would
regain such strict scrutiny, courts may balk at the invitation to enmesh themselves further
into intimate family relations.
97. Ltr. Rul. 7835076 (June 1, 1978).
98. Id.
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to protect the marriage penalty, it surely would expect the Service to strike down all tax-motivated divorces, whether or not
the couple remarried later. For purposes of the motive test, the
letter ruling's hypothetical, which stipulated a tax-motivated
divorce, is indistinguishable from the situation governed by
Revenue Ruling 76-255.
Perhaps the Commissioner issued the letter ruling to avoid
being forced later to decide when a couple that divorces and
cohabits becomes "divorced" for tax purposes. Unfortunately,
Revenue Ruling 76-255 imposes a similar problem: to decide how
long a cohabiting couple must remain divorced before it is presumed that the parties did not intend to remarry at the time of
their divorce. Perhaps the Commissioner did not want to become
entangled in difficult factual investigations to distinguish
friendly divorces from tax-motivated divorces. But as we have
seen above, 99 such a consideration could affect challenges to yearend divorces under Revenue Ruling 76-255. It seems clear that the
Commissioner's line is one of administrative and evidentiary convenience. If, at some future date, the IRS chose to challenge a
divorce under circumstances similar to those treated in the letter
ruling, 100 it could surely find every bit as much support from the
motive te.st as it presently finds for Revenue Ruling 76-255. 101
Thus, application of the motive standard to year-end divorces authorizes the IRS and the courts to delve into the domestic affairs of any divorced couple. If used to promote a congressional desire to tax married couples more heavily than single
individuals, it is alarmingly open-ended. Notwithstanding Letter
Ruling 7835076, the test itself suggests no dividing lines and mires
courts in domestic inquiries that they have studiously avoided in
other tax cases. 102 It then forces them to create a federal marital
status despite the longstanding tradition of relying on the marital
status determinations of a state or foreign jurisdiction to make
federal tax decisions. Thus, the motive test seems an undesirable
way to apply the sham doctrine to year-end divorce and remarriage.
99. See text at notes 95-96 supra.
100. Similar to a revenue ruling, the private ruling is not binding on the Commissioner nor on the courts. See Rev. Proc. 76-29, 1976-2 C.B. 646.
101. By restricting the advantages of a tax-related divorce in Ltr. Ru!. 7835076 (June
1, 1978), the Commissioner has already forced tax factors into the decision to remarry.
The possibility of a more extensive application of the Rev. Ru!. 76-255 position would
further hamper socially desirable reconciliation since resumed relations would raise the
specter of a tax penalty.
102. See notes 39-62 supra and accompanying text.

May 1979)

Note - Sham Doctrine

1353

CONCLUSION

Revenue Ruling 76-255 seems misconceived. Although courts
have established that local law determines marital status for tax
purposes, the Ruling invokes sham doctrine to challenge divorces
issued according to proper local procedures. The doctrine does not
fit the gap into which the Internal Revenue Service has tried to
wedge it. In commercial contexts, it is used to protect a clear
congressional purpose; however, it is debatable that Congress intended to question valid state divorce decrees and to create a
marriage penalty. Furthermore, even if a year-end divorce and
remarriage scheme contravenes a congressional desire, the sham
doctrine is not an appropriate remedy. Neither of the sham doctrine tests adequately explains the Commissioner's analysis of
different year-end divorce situations, and any form of sham analysis would require courts to pierce the marriage veil with an analytic knife previously reserved for commercial transactions. 103
Under the beneficial interest test, a year-end divorce would never
be stricken as a sham because it inevitably exposes the couple to
substantial, albeit brief, risks associated with loss of the legal,
economic, and emotional benefits of marriage. The motive test,
on the other hand, would plunge courts into hair-spliJ;ting factual
investigations under circumstances inconducive to productive
inquiry. Whatever a couple's motivations for divorce, is it appropriate to expose them to IRS scrutiny? 104 And should a couple that
103. Applying the sham doctrine necessarily injects uncertainty into relations,
whether commercial or domestic. Herman Fuller has described succinctly the tradeoff
between fully enforcing congressional desires through the sham doctrine and uncertainty:
If [sham cases] are limited in application to the extreme situations in which they
originate, they do not solve the problems which give rise to them; if they are applied
more sweepingly by an activist judiciary, the impossibility of predicting the outcome of more questionable cases tends to undermine certainty.
Fuller, supra note 32, at 375. While we begrudgingly tolerate a limited amount of uncertainty in business transactions, it is especially troubling in family relations. Indeed, the
history of the Internal Revenue Code is replete with condemnations of interference with
such intimate decisions. For example, when Congress was considering a mandatory joint
return in 1941 to combat the inequalities created by community property states, the critics
clamored their disapproval: "Of course, the provision was 'un-American.' The contention
was that by making the marital relation a taxable privilege the 'sly and tricky' provision
was arbitrary and against public policy in that it struck at the institution of marriage,
was an attack upon the family, and promoted celibacy.'' R. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED
STATES 275 (1954).
104. Some observers believe that overly intrusive divorce proceedings (and by analogy, overly intrusive inquiries into the validity of a divorce by the IRS) may seriously
undermine the institution of marriage:
The requirement of disclosing in open court or in the lawyer's office any of the
various grounds for divorce such as adultery, intemperance, or cruelty entails a
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is deemed divorced and free to remarry by the court of their
marital domicile be deemed joined in the bonds of matrimony for
federal tax purposes?
Admittedly, year-end divorce and remarriage schemes are
troublesome tax avoidance devices. They violate notions of fair
play and equity. But if Congress is genuinely offended by the
schemes, it can attack them through direct, bright-line rules.• 0:;
The IRS should not be allowed to lead the assault by applying a
business doctrine to the most intimate societal unit.
public exposure of the most intimate and often embarrassing details of married
life•... Such state-sponsored invasions of privacy in divorce contests can only
demean the marriage relationship, humiliate the parties, and damage the residual
family relationships, whatever the outcome of the contest.
Goldstein & Gitter, Divorce Without Blame, 30 HUMANISTS No. 3, 12, 14 (1970).
105. If Congress genuinely believes that year-end divorce schemes frustrate its purpose, the solution is remarkably simple. Section 143 could be amended to provide that a
person must be single at least six months of the calendar year in order to qualify for singles
tax rates. Congress's failure to adopt this device when it first passed § 143 suggests that
it was not so concerned with whether a taxpayer's marital status for tax purposes reflects
that person's legal marital status for most of the year. Instead, Congress only wanted a
simple, straightforward rule for ascertaining marital status for tax purposes. Thus, it chose
to rely upon an individual's legal marital status as of a given date-December 31. If
Congress now finds the rule too lax, it should not rely on the courts to tighten it, See
Hanover Bank v. Commissioner, 369 U.S. 672, 688 n.23 (1962), where the Court stated:
We believe the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit was correct when it said in
Fabreeka Products Co. v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 876, 879: "Granting the government's proposition that these taxpayers have found a hole in the dike, we believe
it one that calls for the application of the congressional thumb, not the court's,"

